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COMMENTARY
SCHOLARSHIP AMOK: EXCESSES IN THE PURSUIT
OF TRUTH AND TENURE

Kenneth Lasson:;'
[N]ot everything that man thinks must he say; not everything he says
must he write, but most important not everything that he has written
must he publish.
KING SOLOMON (1033-975

B.C.)1

There are two things wrong with almost all legal writing. One is its
style. The other is its content.
YALE LAW PROFESSOR FRED RODELL (1907-1980)2

Here we are, three millennia after Solomon and a full half-century
since Fred Rodell, and what have we?
In 1937, when Rodell issued his once-famous diatribe, some ISO
law-related journals were being published3 (not to mention thousands
of local newspapers and countless full-color comic books). Now there
are over eight hundred legal periodicals4 (not to mention a drastically
dwindled number of daily papers, and precious few comics). Both
Solomon and Rodell have been all but forgotten. What, indeed, have
we wrought? Although Rodell predicted his original panning would
have no effect, could he have anticipated the sheer dimensions of this
worst-case scenario - that his "professional purveyors of pretentious
poppycock"5 would have spawned so furiously, that the contemporary
* Professor of Law, University of Baltimore. I wish to acknowledge all those who inspired
this Commentary, many of whom know who they are.
These notes are offered mostly as an accommodation to the editors, who labor under the
dual handicaps of tradition and inexperience. Recognizing the few pros and cons of footnoting,
however - see infra pp. 937-41 - I have taken some pains to make my references a bit more
relevant, entertaining, and minimal than the reader who has gotten this far has a right to
expect.
1 Rav Yisroel Salanter (1810-1883) attributes the saying to Solomon in KOHELESIECCLESIASTES 202 (Artscroll Tanach Series ed. 1976). See Ecclesiastes 12:12 ("[T]he making of many
books is without limit. ").
2 Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews, 23 VA. L. REv. 38, 38 (1936). Rodell's Goodbye was
once called "perhaps the most widely read - and most controversial - article in all of legal
literature." Margolick, Always the Rebel, Nat'l L.]., May 5, 1980, at I, 24, col. 2; see also
Wright, Goodbye to Fred Rodell, 89 YALE L.J. 1455 (1980).
3 See INDEX TO LEGAL PERIODICALS, Aug. 1937-July 1940.
4 See 9 CURRENT LAW INDEX pt. a (1988) (providing a list of such publications).
5 Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews - Revisited, 48 VA. L. REv. 279, 286 (1962).
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law reviews he collectively called "spinach"6 would have mushroomed
into such a gargantuan souffle of airy irrelevance?
Lo, the voices are heard once again in the wilderness, from the
bewildered among us innocent (or ignorant) enough to try writing the
wrongs perpetrated in the name of Scholarship.
Few professors today delude themselves about (or are able to
luxuriate in) the long-romanticized lifestyle of Academia: walking the
quiet quadrangles of neatly manicured college gardens, discoursing
timelessly with colleagues, thinking higher thoughts. Fewer still aspire
to scholarship purely in search of Truth. Nowadays the goal of (
publication is much less to find answers than to avoid perishing in
pursuit of promotion and tenure.
The threshold question, of course, is why Scholarship? "He who
increases knowledge," said Solomon, "increases grief."7
Certainly there exist among us the genuine scholars of yesteryear,
dutifully reporting their original ideas and producing from time to
time provocative prose and innovative agendas. (Rodell himself belonged in this small group, if for no other reason than having been
the first to say publicly what so many of us - weaker-kneed, wimpiereyed, and more thoroughly word-processed - privately bemoan
within the sanctum, sanctorum of the faculty lounge.)
But for every pure scholar we have a dozen-and-a-half of the
innocent ersatz, for every diamond a heap of rhinestones. Some of
them are decent enough thinkers stickied-up by pedestrian prose,
industrious worker-bees who - simply by virtue of the thousands of
articles with which they must periodically compete - must of necessity be deemed mediocre. They are in greater part, however, competent enough teachers without anything original to write, doomed to
scholarly mediocrity by academic imperative - coerced clones who
are whipped into a hack's frenzy, urged to jump through hoops held
up by the local promotion-and-tenure committee, forced to shimmy
down the chutes of the publication process.
To some degree all of them - whether genuine scholars, wouldbe wisemen, or coerced clones - are motivated by the gratification
of ego, the satisfaction of habit, and the expectations of university
image-makers. In turn these traits are fueled by faculty self-studies,
administrative mission statements, and fiats laid down by the Association of American Law Schools, 8 most of which become etched in
ivory long before their floppy disks ever begin to stiffen.
This Commentary is intended as much to define scholarship as to
debunk it, to separate the wind-blown chaff from the few kernels that

6

See Rodell, supra note

2,

at 45.

7 Ecclesiastes 1:18.
8

See, e.g.,

ASS'N OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS, ASSOCIATION HANDBOOK § 6.8 (1988).
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might nourish the mind. Legal scholarship is largely illustrated by
the law reviews which, conversely, both contribute to and reflect the
value system by which the academy is governed. Even cursory observation of the literature leads to an inescapable conclusion: the
number of whole-grain scholars is much smaller than that suggested
by the burgeoning reviews, the number of whole-grain journals but a
fraction of the fruited plains currently being harvested in law libraries
across the land. Analysis, research, and writing are overblown, while
classroom competence, community service, and non-law review scholarship are under-credited. The system is askew. The academy has a
problem.
I.

MULTITUDES AND MINUTIAE

In an ideal world, people govern themselves; governments pass
laws only when necessary; laws are easy to understand and follow;
lawyers are uniformly bright, energetic advocates - fair, ethical, and
sensitive; they emerge from law schools offering logical, interesting
curricula taught by fair, sensitive professors; and the curricula are
complemented by the fruits of faculty research - which scholarship
is distilled into useful, interesting articles and published in well-edited
reviews.
In the real world all of the above may exist, but in greatly diminishing degree. Scholarship could be valuable; most of it isn't. Whatever rich stew there might have been thins quickly into gruel through
the sheer multitude of journals seeking fodder for their troughs. Slops
fill the law reviews. Simply put, there are too many of them.
Consider the numbers involved. Of the 8oo-plus journals in the
exclusive Current Law Index alone, most appear at least three times
throughout the year, each with several lead articles apiece. By conservative estimate, that's five thousand new pieces annually! Could
even a small percentage of this massive productivity (which law librarians privately label the Junk Stream) be worth readers' whiles?
And, one must hasten to ask, what readers? Most reviews have
very limited circulations, consisting primarily of libraries and alumni.
Few in the latter group pay any attention to the esoteric titles appearing on the cover, much less to the contents inside. For all the
work professors put into law review articles, one would think they'd
be able to attract a larger audience than the sprinkling of colleagues
who skim through off-prints out of courtesy or the handful of students
who may wade through them because they've been assigned. Even
fewer practicing attorneys read such secondary sources out of nonbillable interest.
Helping to perpetuate this endless multitude of articles are exhaustive "research tools," supplying comprehensive cross-references
and mind-boggling databases. The Index to Legal Periodicals and
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the Current Law Index both reflect and contribute to the epidemic
proportions of publication.
Beyond sheer numbers, consider the journals themselves. The
Harvard Law Review is arguably the 0ldest,9 still among the toughest
to break into,lO and certainly the one most emulated, both in form
and content. Yet even Harvard's goals were exceedingly modest at
the beginning. From Volume I, Number I:
Our object, primarily, is to set forth the work done in the school with
which we are connected, to furnish news of interest to those who have
studied law in Cambridge, and to give, if possible, to all who are
interested in the subject of legal education, some idea of what is done
under the Harvard system of instruction. Yet we are not without
hopes that the Review may be serviceable to the profession at large. 11

How serviceable the Harvard Law Review has been in all the years
since remains open to question, but of the most-cited articles in the
past half-century the overwhelming majority come from Cambridge. 12
Nevertheless every law school now has at least one review to call
its own, each looking and reading depressingly like the rest. Despite
scattered attempts by editors to distinguish their journals by theme
and discipline, redundancy abounds. Besides the fundamentally fungible general-interest reviews, we have the Journal of Law and Religion and the Journal of Church and State; the International Lawyer
and the Journal of International Law (not to mention the Connecticut
Journal of International Law, the Yale Journal of International Law,
and the Wisconsin Journal of International Law); the American Criminal Law Review, the Criminal Law Journal, the Criminal Law Bulletin, the Criminal Law Quarterly, and the Criminal Law Review.
The list goes on and on. Law reviews are published from Adelaide
to Zambia. There's the Pacific Basin Law Review, the San Fernando
Valley Law Review, and the Samoan Pacific Law Review. Don't know
which one is best for your little gem-of-an-opus? Try the Directory
See Cane, The Role oj Law Review in Legal Education, 31 J. LEGAL Enuc. 215 (1981).
If so, certain enraged readers may ask, how can it accept a piece like this? The writer
himself, though, rejects Groucho Marx's famous analysis - "I'd never join a club that would
have somebody like me as a member" - and congratulates the editors on their good judgment.
Truth to tell, given the central thesis presented herein, there was little doubt it would be
published somewhere among the 800-plus journals currently clogging legal libraries everywhere;
might as well start at the top. For a confidential list of those journals that rejected this article,
please send a self-addressed stamped envelope to Professor Kenneth Lasson, University of
Baltimore School of Law, Maryland at Mount Royal, Baltimore, Maryland 21201. This offer
expires when I run out of self-satisfaction.
II I HARV. L. REv. 35 (1887).
12 See Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Ret,iew Articles, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 1540, 1549-51
(1985). In addition, Harvard is still the only review in America that is self-sustaining, unsubsidized by university or bar association. See Cane, supra note 9, at 215.
9

10

93 0

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 103:926

for Successful Publishing in Legal Periodicals, which lists only the
450 most choice ones.
The lead articles themselves are often overwhelming collections of
minutiae, perhaps substantively relevant at some point in time to an
individual practitioner or two way out in the hinterlands - and that
almost entirely by chance. Otherwise they are relegated to oblivion,
or if lucky to a passing but see in someone else's obscure piece.
True (and perhaps good), law today pervades all aspects of life but must all aspects of life be treated in law reviews? Here's a
sampling of recent articles:
The Unrecognized Uses of Legal Education in Papua New Guinea l3
The Legal Status of Fish Farming l4
Epistemological Foundations and Meta-Hermeneutic Methods: The
Search for a Theoretical Justification of the Coercive Force of Legal
I nterpretation l5
If Spot Bites the Neighbor, Should Dick and Jane Go to Jail?16
Judicial Review: From the Frog to Mickey Mouse l7
What's Love Got To Do With It? Critical Legal Studies, Feminist
Discourse, and the Ethic of Solidarity l8
Morality or Sittlichkeit: Toward a Post-Hegelian Solution 19
Toward a Legal Theory of Popular Culture 20
Toward an Economic Theory of Voluntary Resignation by Dictators21
The Dijferentzation of Francophone Rapists and Nonrapists Using
Penile Circumferential Measures 22
Why Study Pacific Salmon Law?23

Why, indeed.
You may not be able to tell an article by its title, but it's evident
that originality is in short supply among authors and editors wonder13 7 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 1 (1987).
141987 J. PLAN. & ENVTL. L. 484.
15 68 B.U.L. REv. 733 (1988).
16 39 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1445 (1988); see also New South Carolilla Dog Bite Rule, 38 S.C.L.
REv. 236 (1986).
17 32 N. IR. LEGAL Q. 284 (1981); see also Rediscoverillg Traditiollal Tort Typologies To

Determille Media Liability jor Physical Injuries: From the Mickey Mouse Club to Hustler
Magazine, 10 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. 969 (1988).
18 I I HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 53 (1988).
19 10 CARDOZO L. REv. 1389 (1989).
20 1986 WIS. L. REv. 527.
21 5 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 199 (1985).
22 13 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 419 (1986).
23 22 IDAHO L. REv. 629 (1986).
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ing what to call their mind-numbing research. According to LEXIS,
the words "toward," "model," and "theory" have appeared in no fewer
than 7275 titles during the past decade alone 24 - making them the
most popular titular buzzwords since "integrated" and "functional"
came down the pike. "Confusion" reigns at the top of 358 recent
articles. 25 In fact you can find almost any word you can think of even "penile" has shown up six times in the past three years. 26
Legislative analysis frequently turns into law review manure. Do
we really need 141 separate articles on federal solid-waste-disposal
laws? Would that the promulgators of scholarship patterns recognize
the dimensions of their own garbage-removal problem. Too often,
though, they're more concerned with churning it out. They pollute
the environment. They miss the forests they destroy for the knotted
trees in whose dark shade they obscurely bask.27
But the journals continue to take themselves ever so seriously.
That's another reason why the literature of the law is perhaps the
most massive of any profession. A colleague of mine 28 reports that
the editors of one midwestern law review were not amused when he
asked them the status of their potato-law symposium issue. Perhaps
they were having trouble digging up lead articles, but chances are
they had too many sacksful to choose from.

II.

VALUE AMONG THE VOLUME(S)

It's been said before that law reviews were made to be written
and not read. Regardless of their questionable benefit to bar and
bench, they do have some value for some students. The few who
"make law review" no doubt receive exceptionally good training in
logical thought and formal exposition, not to mention source-checking.
24 The figures, tabulated as of November 1989, are absurdly easy to gather and verify by
modern computer. My thanks to University of Baltimore Law Librarian Emily Greenberg and
her associate Will Tress for their generous instruction and use of the school's Lexis key. Tress
holds the current world records (both semester and career) for the fewest "inappropriate command" rebukes from a legal database.
2S Look it up yourself.
26 Could we be moving "Towards a Model Penile Code"?
27 A pertinent passage:
)
[T]he possible undervaluation of motherhood entailed by the mother/soldier parallel is
similar to the possible undervaluation of women's work implied by the elementary school
teacher/garbage collector. . .. Undervaluing the traditionally female half of the parallel
is only additional evidence of the culture's phallocentrismj it does not justify refusing to
revalue nurses, teachers, and mothers at least to the extent that real estate appraisers,
garbage collectors, and soldiers are valued.
Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CALIF. L. REv. 1279, 1329 (1987). ';I'his article
runs 58 pages and 34,072 words - of which 42 are either "phallocentrism" or "phallocentric"
(meaning male dominance).
28 Professor John Lynch, faculty advisor to the University of Baltimore Law Review.
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Indeed, the reviews can do a good job correcting deficiencies in (or
at least complementing) the traditional law school curriculum, which
frequently provides precious little in the way of research and writing.
They also offer an outlet for student initiative in the face of curricular
boredom. However, the hard fact that the majority of law reviews
are exclusive clubs, closed to all but those with the highest grades or
demonstrated writing ability, calls the scope of their educational value
into question. 29
A good many professors can likewise benefit from researching and
writing within their chosen fields of interest and discipline, in the
process stimulating their involvement and dissipating that particular
inertia which often permeates the Ivory Tower.
But the limited value of legal scholarship as it appears in law
reviews is largely outweighed by its costs. The proliferation of research and writing tends more to increase quantity than quality. One
article is no longer good enough for promotion; an aspirant must
establish a "pattern" of publication. 30
Professorial purposes can be accomplished in better ways than
omphaloskepsis (law review-quality Greek for "contemplation of the
navel"). 31 Belly-button gazing should be a luxury allowed only those
few whose writing is deemed both incisive and succinct. The rest
should be encouraged to more logical productivity as teachers and
community leaders.
Considering the scholarly stuff many obscure writers have to offer,
they deserve the anonymity promised by the multitude of lesser journals. Some might even prefer it.
Meanwhile, the impact of law reviews on the judiciary is diminishing;32 would their absence cause the courts to cease viewing issues
analytically? No more than closing down the Department of Agriculture's Rural Electrification Administration (Office of Information and
Public Mfairs) would have any effect whatever on television watching
in Appaloosa. In fact, as a casual glance through Shepard's Law
Review Citations will disclose, the overwhelming majority of articles
are noted not by courts or legislatures, but by one anotherP3 Re29 Some feel the fact that law reviews are mostly student-run constitutes a fundamental
weakness. See J. SELIGMAN, THE HIGH CITADEL 183-85 (1978).
30 See UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE SCHOOL OF LAW, FACULTY HANDBOOK at J-6 (19791980). "Mechanical requirements cast in terms of a specific number of articles of a particular
form or in particular journals are likely to cause more harm than good." Cramton, "The Most
Remarkable Institution": The American Law Review, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. I, II (1986).
31 Perhaps a better description is "sesquipedalian tergiversation" (multi-syllabled evasiveness).
32 See Kaye, One Judge's View of Academic Law Review Writing, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 313

(1989).
33 See id. at 320 (pointing out the lack of "value and pertinence" of law reviews to judicial
decisionmaking); Schuck, Why Don't Law Professors Do More Empirical Research?, 39 J. LEC'AL
EDUC. 323, 336 (1989) (same).
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markably few are ever cited in the primary sources - case reports or
annotated codes.
There are so many publications clamoring to fill their pages with
Law Most Learned, however, that few contributors need worry about
dwindling forums for their prose. Moreover, all of the participants in
the process - pupils, professors, practitioners, printers, and publishers - are quite content to go on greasing one another's palms and
egos. 34
Much of this enormous hodge-podge has a built-in obsolescence
about it as well, largely by virtue of the law reviews' extended editing
process. Most often the lag is so long between the first dull gleam in
an author's eye and the finished product that whatever might be timely
and relevant is largely lost on whatever few readers may be out there.
The stuff is simply stale. Scholarship in the scientific community, by
way of comparison, is of considerably greater utility and immediacy;
that may explain why articles in medical journals, for example, are
generally much shorter and contain fewer footnotes. 35
Here and there amidst the morass of law reviews are occasional
stabs at candid self-criticism. For example, various observers have
noted that supposedly analytical commentaries are predominantly descriptive and mildly plagiaristic;36 those published during pending
litigation interfere with the judicial process;37 the scholarly voice lacks
factual discipline;38 and that scholarship qua scholarship on law may
not even exist. 39 Justice William Douglas said that law review articles
are written by paid hacks espousing the views of their clients. 40
Professor Arthur Miller argues that objectivity is impossible in law
review articles because of lawyers' inalienable commitment to advo-

34 See Elson, The Case Against Legal Scholarship or, If the Professor Must Publish, Must
the Profession PerisM, 39 J. LEGAL EDuc. 343, 344-45 (1989); Rodell, supra note 2, at 45.
But cf. Strong, The Iowa Law Review at Age Fifty, 50 IOWA L. REv. 12, 13 (1964) (supporting

the existence of law reviews).
35 See Austin, Footnotes As Product Differentiation, 40 VAND. L. REv. II31, II52 (1987);
see also infra notes 97-102 and accompanying text (arguing that the language of most law
review articles does not effectively communicate to nonscholars).
36 See, e.g., Nowak, Woe Unto You, Law Reviews!, 27 ARIZ. L. REv. 317, 322-23 (1985).
3; See GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 1018 (9th Cir. 1976)
(Chambers, J., concurring and dissenting).
38 See Getman, Voices, 66 TEX. L. REv. 577, 580-81 (1988).
39 See Tushnet, Legal Scholarship: Its Causes and Cures, 90 YALE L.J. 1205, 1205 (1981);
see also Jensen, The Law Review Manuscript Glut: The Need for Guidelines, 39 J. LEGAL
EDuc. 383, 385 (1989) ("The legal publication system is, to put it bluntly, absurd."); Leibman
& White, How the Student-Edited Law Journals Make Their Publication Decisions, 39 J.
LEGAL EDuc. 387, 418 (1989) (discussing weaknesses in the law-review model and ways to
correct those weaknesses). "[I]f a publication medium is perceived by its users to be biased,
capricious, narrow, rigid, and unqualified, they will seek alternatives, even if the perceptions
are mostly or totally unfounded." I d.
40 See Douglas, Law Reviews and Full Disclosure, 40 WASH. L. REv. 227, 229-31 (1965).
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cacy.41 Professor Roger Cramton sees their "extraordinary proliferation" as "harmful for the nature, evaluation, and accessibility of legal
scholarship. "42 Professor Elyce Zenoff (in an article entitled I Have
Seen the Enemy and They Are Us) sums up the common criticisms:
"Published articles lack originality, are boring, too long, too numerous,
and have too many footnotes, which also are boring and too long. "43
But these criticisms are few and far between and - perhaps also
because they are published in law reviews themselves - go widely
ignored.
It was Rodell, again, who summed it up best - over fifty years
ago: "This centripetal absorption in the home-made mysteries and
sleight-of-hand of the law would be a perfectly harmless occupation
if it did not consume so much time and energy that might better be
spent otherwise. "44 Instead, we go on "blithely continuing to make
mountain after mountain out of tiresome technical molehills,"45 not to
mention the sacrifices made in personal income. It appears that law
professors must be either independently wealthy or married to rich
spouses. "Else why - once they have won their full professorships,
at any rate - do they keep sUbmitting that turgid, legaldegooky
garbage to law reviews - for free?"46
Here's a modest (and unoriginal)47 proposal for reform: let the
local reviews enhance the educational value needed to justify their
41 See Miller, The Myth of Objectivity in Legal Research and Writing, 18 CATH. U.L. REv.
290, 294-95 (1969).
42 Cramton, supra note 30, at 8. For another inteJIigent critique, see Cramton, Demystifying
Legal Scholarship, 75 GEO. L.J. I (1986). See also Antoline, A Burst of SPecialty Allentatives,
STUDENT LAW., May 1989, at 26-30 (discussing the proliferation of "alternative journals");
Jensen, supra note 39, at 384 (mentioning a "glut" of legal articles); Leibman & White, supra
note 39, at 418 (describing a "flood of paper and ink at the medium- and high-impact journals".
43 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 21, 21 (1986) (footnotes omitted); see also Gresham's Law of Legal
Scholarship, 3 CONST. COMMENTARY 307, 309 (1986) (suggesting that the principle of "adverse
selection" operates in legal scholarship to ensure that "law review literature will be dominated
by articles taking silly positions"). For an especially thoughtful, well-articulated - and unheeded
- piece, see Bard, Scholarship, 31 J. LEGAL EDUC. 242 (1981).
Scholarship is legal academe's temple jade: we sing its glories and genuflect before it,
bedizen it with jewels, and then demean it by pretending to make it the gate keeper of
the profession. It becomes the price we must pay to be a law professor, rather than the
prime privilege of that calling. And, most justly, it reciprocates in kind, by forcing us
to accept as scholarship work that is little more than ritualized diligence.
Id. at 242; see also Murray, Publish and Perish - By Suffocation, 27 J. LEGAL EDUC. 566,
566 (1975) (quoting George Eliot, who offered this sadly under-used benediction: "Blessed is the
man who, having nothing to say, abstains from giving in words evidence of the fact."'; Cane,
supra note 9, at 221 nn.35-39 and accompanying text (arguing that law reviews form the basis
of an "old boy" network that propagates itself from generation to generation). For a particularly
bitter, and thus more easily dismissed, attack on the system, see Elson, cited above in note 34.
44 Rodell, supra note 2, at 43.
4S

Id.

Rodell, supra note 5, at 288.
47 See, e.g., Martin, The Law Review Citadel: Rodell Revisited, 71 IOWA L. REv. 1093,
46
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existence by making themselves accessible to all the local law students
and professors, and reduce their publication costs by putting all articles onto a computerized database instead of into print. Students and
professors alike would thereby be able to polish their research and
writing skills - without wasting the time of printers and publishers,
postal workers, law librarians, and compulsive readers of junk mail.
ITL

SCHOLARSHIP: WE

KNow IT

WHEN WE SEE

IT

It is quite possible that reducing the number of law reviews might
only address the symptoms of a deeper malaise - in particular the
value system reflected by promotion-and-tenure policies as they are
worshipfully applied through the criteria of "research, analysis, and
writing."
Webster's defines scholarship simply as "a fund of knowledge and
learning. "48 Faculties of law have much more difficulty with the
concept; they grapple with the meaning of scholarship just as Justice
Stewart was unable to define pornography. "But I know it," he said,
"when I see it. "49
For purposes of promotion and tenure, "scholarship" means written
and published materials which meet all of the following criteria: they
are "analytical," "significant," "learned," "well-written," and "disinterested."so
Each of these terms is likewise chewed over like cud, all the while
defying objective definition. To be analytical, according to the bylaws
of the typical faculty, "[t]he materials must provide a detailed, wellsupported and sophisticated analysis that increases our understanding
of the topic, and must do more than describe a body of law or a legal
problem."sl A colleague of mine speaks of "massaging ideas," whatever that is. As we shall see shortly, no amount of analysis seems to
increase our understanding of the term itself.
II04 (1986); see also Hewitt, Altered States: Evolution or Revolution in Journal-Based Communicatiolls, 25 AMERICAN LIBR. 497, 497-500 (1989); Westwood, The Law Review Should
Become tlte Law School, 31 VA. L. REv. 913 (1945).
48 WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1051 (1988) [hereinafter WEBSTER'S
DICTIONARY].
49 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
50 See, e.g., UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE SCHOOL OF LAW, FACULTY HANDBOOK at H-I.6,
H-I.7 (1989-1990) [hereinafter BALTIMORE FACULTY HANDBOOK]; cf UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND SCHOOL OF LAW, FACULTY HANDBOOK at B.2-1 (1985) (noting that "[a] candidate for
tenure is required to have engaged in significant research and to have produced a significant
product or products"}. An exceptionally liberal policy, along the lines of that recommended in
this Commentary, may be found in SANTA CLARA UNIVERSITY, FACULTY HANDBOOK (1987),
which notes that the criteria for promotion and tenure include an evaluation of the candidate's
creative work, including "recognized accomplishment or significant production in the arts of
painting, sculpture, music, drama, fiction, poetry, dance, journalism, or the like." !d. ~ 3.6.2.
51 BALTIMORE FACULTY HANDBOOK, supra note 50, at H-I.6.
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To be significant, "[t]he materials must make a significant contribution to the legal literature. They must do more than reiterate or
rephrase previous analyses of the topic and they must not represent
the work of others."52 But the words "significant" and "more than"
are inescapably subjective. Were they applied strictly, a significant
portion of all law review material would be thrown out as representing
in some way the work of others.
To be learned, "[t]he materials must demonstrate deep familiarity
with and understanding of the body of knowledge associated with the
topic. "53 To be well-written, they "must be written in a manner
appropriate to the subject matter, and must demonstrate the candidate's ability to convey his or her ideas effectively."54 Again, these
are patently subjective criteria that in most cases give no more guidance in promotion and tenure decisions than does the gut feeling of
how well a candidate gets along with his colleagues.
Indeed, the only objective standard is the last. To be disinterested,
"the materials must not be published to serve the interests of any
client, either paid or pro bono. "55 But the overinclusiveness of this
standard suggests a failure of common sense. Suppose a pro bono
article goes against a client's interests? Suppose a professor is commissioned to do an exhaustive study? In neither case should his
scholarship be discredited out of hand, but it is.
Besides their inherent subjectivity, the promotion-and-tenure standards of most faculties focus unduly on articles published in law
reviews. Often neither briefs nor practice manuals - no matter how
learned or useful - are considered "scholarship." Nor would a casebook or treatise be as presumptively satisfactory as a law review
article. One wonders how the promotion and tenure committee would
handle Socrates, who never published a word. 56
One senior professor summed up the meaning of scholarship for
the purposes of promotion and tenure from a much more practical
and concrete point of view, giving this advice to a junior colleague:
the way to get ahead, he advised, is to "take an obscure little problem
that no one has thought much about, blow it out of all proportion,
and solve it, preferably several times, in prestigious law reviews."57
Law schools generally consider scholarship to be an amalgam of
research, analysis, and writing. As such it is taught as a required

52

53
54
55

[d. at H-I.6, H-I.7.
[d. at H-I.7.
[d.
[d.

I didn't think of this myself, but neither, I'm sure, did the journalist (whose name I forget)
from whom I stole it.
Si Barrett, To Read This Story in Full, Don't Forget To See the Footllotes, Wall St. ]., May
10, 1988, at 25, col. 2.
56
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course in the first year, and genuflected upon in all years hence, from
practice through retirement. But scholarship can be largely demystified by examining its traditional components.

A. Research: Bushwhacking Through the Thickets
Legal research is at once objective - that is, there are a finite
number of sources to be gathered and culled - an'd an open-ended
art form.
With the advent of computerized data banks such as Lexis and
Westlaw, gleaning all the cases on point is as easy as playing Trivial
Pursuit and maybe even more fun. Finding everything that's ever
been written on the subject requires little more than leafing through
the Current Law Index or its older but perfectly adequate counterpart,
the Index to Legal Periodicals. And the whole mass can be saturationbombed with cross-references by resorting to an endless array of Shepard's Citations. (There, I've given away the secrets of legal research
in less than a paragraph!) As for gleaning the most relevant and
salient authorities, the possibilities are infinite - and are what separate the grown-up academics from the boys and girls.
Nowadays, unfortunately, research skills often amount to little
more than mastery of the citation forms. The genuine scholars, besides being creative writers, are highly selective in their choice of
relevant data. But many modern professors tend to toss their excess
research into the annotation hopper and leave it to their readers (or
editors) to separate the salient stuff from the mildly tangential. That's
why it's harder to write without footnotes than with them: it takes a
good writer to decide what's on point and what's off - it's easier to
keep baby and bathwater in the same textual tub. And it's safer,
both intellectually (allowing the writer to straddle any issue by taking
a strong position in the text while waffling below) and morally (permitting him to stave off plagiarism with grudging acknowledgments
in four-point type) - not to mention more ego-gratifying (enabling
intricate citation of arcane sources at stupefying length).
The number of notes in an article is still deemed a measure of its
erudition. Although there are occasions of reverse snobbery - where
it is implied (as in this essay)58 that notes are beneath an author's
time, dignity or expertise - the more common scholarship seeks to
impress by both magnitude and multitude of bottom-matter. The
longer the note, the greater the breadth of its author's knowledge; the
more numerous the references, the more comprehensive his treatment
of the subject matter. The current individual record-holder is Arnold
58 See supra note *; infra note 67. For a good example of authors' disdain for footnotes
flying in the face of editorial compulsion to add them, see Gabel & Kennedy, Roll Over
Beethoven, 36 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1984).
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S. Jacobs, Esq., who recently drew his readers away from the text
no fewer than 4824 times - easily eclipsing the former mark held by
Dean Jesse Choper (16II) as well as the group title (3917 by the
Georgetown Law Journal staff).59 Too bad no promotion-and-tenure
credit is given the transcendent task of bushwhacking through such
unintelligible thickets.
Some writers limit their notes strictly to citations of authority,
disdaining what they consider flights of creative irrelevance and esoteric nit-picking. But the purists are passe. The new chic in noting
is to write rambling distinctions laced with "fugitive" sources - exotic
references, rare books, or "letters on file with the author." Incomprehensible law-and-economics graphs and diagrams are also In. 6o
59 See Oser, Numerous Notes No Shot in Foot, Nat'l L.J., Jan. 16, 1989, at 35, col. I; sec
also Jacobs, An Analysis of Section I6 of the Securities Exchange Act of I934, 32 N. Y.L. SCH.
L. REv. 209 (1987) (accompanying Jacobs' 4824 footnotes with 491 pages of text); Choper,
Consequences of Supreme Court Decisions Upholding Individual Constitutional Rights, 83 MICH.
L. REv. I (1984) (accompanying Choper's 16II footnotes with 208 pages of text); Project,
Sixteenth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court and COl/rts of
Appeals I98S-I986, 75 GEO. L.J. 713 (1987) (accompanying the Georgetown staff's 3917 footnotes with 585 pages of text). The alleged record-holder for judicial opinions is United States
v. E.!. Dupont de Nemours & Co., II8 F. Supp. 41 (D. Del. 1953), with 1715 footnotes. Sec
Kaplan, The Article in a Law Review That Included the Most Footnotes Is . . . , Nat'l L.J.,
Mar. 18, 1985, at 4, col. 3. Equally useful information: Disney animators drew 6,469,952 black
spots for the film IOI Dalmatians; there were 17,500,000,000 charcoal briquettes sold in 1988;
and 24% of all Iowans display lawn ornaments. See Harper's Index, HARPER'!:, May, 1989, at
15·
60 I am indebted to my colleague Robert Lande for the following graphic elucidation of my
several theses:
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A remarkably similar law-and-economics graph was recently sighted in Gillcte & Hopkins,
Federal User Fees: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 67 B.U.L. REV. 795, 810 (1987). Such
charts are as incomprehensible to lawyers as higher mathematics or advanced psychology are to
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Two primary strains of footnote virus were identified early on in
the law review epidemic: (I) the explanatory (or if-you-didn't-understand-what-I-wrote-in-the-text-here's-another-stab-at-it) type, and (2)
the vainglorious (or if-you're-from-Kalamazoo-just-take-a-gander-atthis) variety. 61
Most scholars, however, refuse to recognize footnoting as a disease
at all, arguing the benefits that inure to both writer and reader of
teensy typography. Indeed, they spare the reader a barrage of technical trivia he may not need, enable him to uncover shortcomings in
authority, and allow for a smoother-running text. At the same time,
they let a writer more easily separate basic concepts from nuances,
and sometimes force him to justify his positions. 62
On occasion, notes become more important than text. Witness the
famous footnote four in United States v. Carolene Products Co.,63 in
which Justice Stone announced the landmark principle of constitutional jurisprudence that statutes affecting "discrete and insular minorities" must be given strict scrutiny. There's also note fifty-nine in
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.64 and note sixteen in Terry
v. Ohio 65 (which has been cited well over a hundred times).
The most lucid analysis of the subject is a recent article by Arthur
Austin,66 whose tongue-in-cheek tone is somewhat overwhelmed both
by serious assertions in defense of footnotes and by I07 of his own. 67
"In today's publish or perish environment," he writes, "footnote trashing is the slothful tenured establishment's last refuge of snobbery. "68
Au contraire, he suggests that footnoting permits one author to differentiate his work from another's - an "artistic and abstruse discipline that functions as a subtle, but critical, influence in the determination of promotion, tenure, and professional status. "69 Moreover,
laypersons. See, e.g., Grossman, Stability in n-Dimensional Differential,-Delay Equations, 40
MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS ApPLICATIONS 541 (1972); G. ZURIFF, BEHAVIORISM: A CONCEPTUAL RECONSTRUCTION (1985). Grossman and Zuriff are close friends of the author. See infra
note 62.
61 With all due respect to Rodell, cited above in note 2, at 40, I think my version is better.
62 See Martin, supra note 47, at 1097. They also allow a writer to cite self, family, friends,
and colleagues. See, e.g., supra notes 28 & 60; infra notes 72, 109 & II3.
63 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); see also Balkin, The Footnote, 83 Nw. U.L. REv. 275
(1988) (noting the importance of Carotene Products' footnote four from a deconstructionist's
point of view).
64 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940).
6S 392 U.S. I, 19 n.16 (1968).
66 Austin, supra note 35.
67 My congratulations to the reader discerning enough to question how I have the gall to
chide Austin for his apparent hypocrisy, when I offer over a hundred notes of my own. My
somewhat lame excuse ("the editors made me do it!" - see supra note *) is hereby accompanied
by both abject apologies and an offer to supply another version of this selfsame piece unannotated - to anyone who asks.
68 Austin, supra note 35, at II53.
69 [d. at II35.
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footnotes "serve as embryos for new ideas and an underground source
for humor"70 (no doubt he refers to classics such as The Common Law
Origins oj the Infield Fly Rule 71 and my own Mockingbirds Among
the Brethren 72 ). Not least, he points out that footnoting helps create
the aura of elevated status that ultimately furnishes academics with
hefty consulting fees. 73
But as with the reviews themselves, the negatives far outweigh
the positives. Even Austin recognizes the criticism that footnotes have
become "a serious embarrassment to legal scholarship. "74 Others have
called them '''phony excrescences,"'75 "a means of concealment,"76
"hedges against forthright statements in the text,'>77 and little more
than a "foible [that] breeds nothing but sloppy thinking, clumsy writing, and bad eyes."78 Former Justice Arthur Goldberg felt that footnotes "cause more problems than they solve."79 Judge Abner Mikva
thought they represent dubious erudition - an "abomination" that he
hates to read: "If footnotes were a rational form of communication,
Darwinian selection would have resulted in the eyes being set vertically rather than on an inefficient horizontal plane. "80 Or, as Noel
Coward put it, encountering a footnote "'is like going downstairs to
answer the doorbell while making love. "'81
It's hard enough to keep track of a modern scholar's train of
thought without having to jump back and forth from text to note.
But it's virtually impossible to comprehend footnotes that make ample
use of the signals recommended by A Uniform System oj Citation (the
"Bluebook"). Show me someone who can explain the difference between but see and but cf. and I'll show you a world-class master of
utterly useless distinctions. 82
The core of the problem is the lack of moderation. The notes
often take on a life of their own, snuffing out whatever line of logic
at II53.
123 U. PA. L. REv. 1474 (1975).
72 18 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 441 (1981).
73 See Austin, supra note 35, at II55.
74 [d. at II33.
75 Mikva, Goodbye to Footnotes, 56 U. COLO. L. REv. 647, 647 (1985) (quoting Professor
Rodell).
76 D. MELLINKOFF, LEGAL WRITING: SENSE AND NONSENSE 94 (1982).
70

[d.

71

77

[d.

Rodell, supra note 2, at 41.
Goldberg, The Rise and Fall (We Hope) of Footnotes, 69 A.B.A. J. 255, 255 (1983).
Justice Goldberg may have resigned in part because of footnotes. Complaining about an
appellate opinion with over 500 notes, he observed: "Had I remained on the Supreme Court, I
would have reversed him on this ground because of the sheer impossibility of reviewing an
opinion of this type." !d.
80 Mikva, supra note 75, at 647-48.
81 Barrett, supra note 57, at I n.2, col. 3 (quoting Coward).
82 See A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION, rule 2.2(C) (14th ed. 1986).
78
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the writer seeks to impart. If originality is the goal, why such excessive attribution? Compare the typically bloated American law review
article with its British counterpart: the latter is generally leaner and
cleaner, with far fewer footnotes - and hence eminently more readable.
Scholarship is no different from any other writing in its basic
function: communication. But the geometric growth of footnote
density83 is fundamentally at odds with that purpose. Recognition of
such counter-productivity has been slow in coming, but bubbles up
here and there in new journals that publish shorter, more provocative
articles, and in a few established law reviews - hoping to counter
similar criticism of their own deadweight pieces - which include
relatively note-free "Essay and Dialogue" sections. 84

B. Analysis: Separating the Taut from the Tautological
To Mr. Webster, "analysis" is simply (r) "separation of a whole
into its component parts" and/or (2) "an examination of a complex, its
elements, and their relations. "85
For purposes of promotion and tenure, however, the term appears
to defy definition - even though every P & T Committee requires
that, for scholarship to pass muster, it must be "analytical." Consider
again the attempt made py the typical faculty manual noted earlier:
to be analytical "[t]he materials must provide a detailed, well-supported and sophisticated analysis that increases our understanding of
the topic, and must do more than describe a body of law or a legal
problem. "86 Talk about tautology: to be analytical, the materials must
provide an analysis! In virtually every case, determination of whether
an article increases our understanding of the topic or does anything
more than describe a body of law or a legal problem depends almost
entirely on subjective factors. The more familiar the reader with the
subject matter, the less analytical the article; the more the reader
favors a candidate, the better the analysis; and if the reader dislikes
the candidate for any of many reasons, he can discreetly dismiss the
analysis as wanting. This can be done in all manner of obfuscatory
language. For example, a tenured associate generally regarded as an
effective teacher was recently denied a promotion, largely based on a
committee report stating that his work "did not disprove an accepted
understanding of what the law is or how it works"; it did not provide
"a fresh conceptual framework"; it did not "break new ground."
See Austin, supra note 35, at II44-45.
See, e.g., Essays and Correspondence sections of volumes 84 to 88 (present) of the
Michigall Law Review.
8S WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY, supra note 48, at 82.
86 BALTIMORE FACULTY HANDBOOK, supra note 50, at H-I.6.
83
84
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We'd be more intellectually honest (and fair) if we were to apply
a more liberal meaning to the word "analytical." A workable definition, it seems to me, is "that which describes a body of knowledge,
and offers an opinion about it." The true measure of an article's
quality should be how well it describes the subject, how tautly it is
written, and how cogent we think the opinion - even if we disagree.
A more honest approach (with ourselves and our colleagues) would
begin by conceding the semantic truism that practically everything is
analytical to a degree - and by making our sincere and subjective
judgment based on how well we like it (or its author).
Changing our definition of analysis to give it practical meaning
would also help us escape the law review mindset, and thereby allow
us to reward the writer of useful, enlightening, and provocative essays
- as well as restatements, treatises, practice manuals, model legislation, and all manner of interdisciplinary texts.
C. Writing: Bugaboo oj the Poobahs

It may be hard to say whether good writers are born or made,
but it's painfully obvious that few of them are legal scholars. Law
review prose is predominantly bleak and turgid. Moreover, it seems
to be self-perpetuating. The brightest students, should they become
teachers, are still browbeaten into writing what has been called a
"wonderful profusion of humbug."87 Many observers have noted the
apprehension with which the law school elite regard a student or
professor who resists legalese and insists on simple prose in writing
and speech; the scholarship of such rare beasts is often regarded as
suspect. 88
Similarly, length remains a hallmark of erudition. "[L]et your
words be few, "89 said Solomon himself, but the legal scholars continue
to exalt quantity. Thus if a good writing professor suggests to the
poobahs on the curriculum committee that they reduce the number of
required pages in students' first-year memoranda or their third-year
independent research papers, he will likely be voted down. Few
faculty members understand that the shorter a memo, the more clear
and effective it usually is. Nor would they fathom why Mark Twain
once apologized for a lengthy letter by saying that he didn't have
enough time to write a brief one; it's often more difficult to be concise.
These are the same folks who make promotion-and-tenure decisions
Shenefelt, Disposable Scholarship, Washington Post, Sept. 12, 1989, at A2I, col. ISee, e.g., Rodell, supra note 5, at 289; see also Wright, supra note 2, at 1460 (observing
Rodell's belief that he was denied an endowed chair because he wrote for non-academic publications).
89 Ecclesiastes 5:1.
87

88
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based on the length of law review articles. 9o Next we'll be measuring
page size as we tally up the footnotes.
The way law review articles are written may be the primary reason
that they are so widely unread. The legal scholar's standard prose
has been criticized as everything from "patronizing"91 and "pompous
patois"92 to unintelligible "gibberish. "93 Its long sentences, awkward
syntax, and overweening commitment to noncommittal buzzwords are
at once impressive-sounding and useless.
The law reviews' pretentiousness and singular lack of humor have
been noted earlier. Rodell himself suggested a means by which that
weakness could be overcome: "The best way to get a laugh out of a
law review is to take a couple of drinks and then read an article, any
article, aloud. That can be real1y funny. "94
Humor aside, the reasons behind such poor writing may have as
much to do with the perceived purpose of legal scholarship - indeed
the scholar's understanding of the purpose of law itself - as with an
inability to follow basic rules of grammar, syntax, and style.
Let us suppose that the purpose of law is the betterment of society.
Although it is hard to see how the esoterica so often offered up by
law reviews has any measurable application to real-life problem-solving,95 let us assume these writers do have something serious to say
that may be of value to society's decisionmakers, whether it is about
law and literature, critical legal studies, feminist law - or dog bites
in South Carolina. 96 Is there any justification for not saying it with
greater clarity?
All too frequently the language of scholars is "far removed from
the emotions, language, and understandings of the great majority of
human beings, "97 and the law they seek to analyze, criticize, explain,
or change is lost in a sea of verbal molasses. Those who want to
influence social policy in a more liberal direction have even greater
reason to write understandable English. The intellectual movers and
90 One faculty I know passed a by-law that a law review article of twenty pages or longer
would presumptively satisfy its promotion-and-tenure standards - anything shorter and the
burden of proof would shift to the candidate. The authenticity of this story has been verified
by conversations with a number of colleagues.
91 See Getman, supra note 38, at 581.
92 See Rodell, supra note 5, at 289.
93 See Benson, The End of Legalese: The Game Is Over, 13 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE
519, 520-22 (1984-1985); Shenefelt, supra note 87.
94 Rodell, supra note 2, at 40. Even law professors' intentional efforts at humor are likely
to engender more groans than belly-laughs. See, e.g., On the Lighter Side, 39 J. LEGAL Enuc.
47-54 (1989); On the Lighter Side, 38 J. LEGAL Enuc. 359-68 (1988); see also Leibman &
White, supra note 39, at 423 ("[M]ost attempts by legal writers to employ irony and hyperbole
range from ill-advised to pathetic."). But see supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
95 See Elson, supra note 34, at 347-99.
96 See supra note 16.
97 Getman, supra note 38, at 580.
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shakers need the support of workers, activists, and politicians alike;
new social orders are impossible when such diverse groups cannot
comprehend one another's language - or feel alienated by it. Programs championed in the Ivory Tower but unheard or unfathomed in
town or in board- or caucus-rooms are unlikely to see life beyond the
scarcely-read pages upon which they are printed - a brief flicker
between the time they come off the presses and when they begin to
yellow, tightly bound in dusty library stacks. 98
But let us suppose further that there is value in scholars discoursing among themselves, that it is easier and more efficacious for them
to use the specialized terminology familiar to those in the discipline.
A central problem here is that such highly technical or narrowly
targeted articles frequently appear in the general-interest law reviews.
The tension between necessary jargon and editorial clarity, between
influencing a small audience and accommodating a broader one, is
overwhelming if not impossible. The lay lawyer reading a scholarly
legal essay is hard put to understand it, much less see its search for
Truth. His eyes glazeth over - not only at its length, but its style
and substance as well.
One might argue that medical journals are every bit as impenetrable to the average doctor as law reviews to the lawyer, yet no one
criticizes them for being too technical. But the analogy is weak: the
"truths" sought are essentially different (a medical researcher examines
the safety or effectiveness of a particular drug or procedure or therapy
or policy, and bases his conclusions on specific empirical data), and
most medical reviews are explicitly aimed at specialists in the field
who understand the terms of art (there are relatively few generalinterest scientific journals). Law professors, on the other hand, often
engage in philosophical discourse that has little practical application,
and their colloquies are seldom confined to special-interest reviews.
Communicating clearly, however - even about complex legal
ideas - should not be an impossible task.
Charles Alan Wright recalls a legal writing seminar he took while
a law student at Yale, in which his professor - none other than Fred
Rodell - asked a guest scholar to pick one of his own articles, open
it at random, and read a paragraph. The scholar obliged, says
Wright, and read a paragraph "filled with the jargon and convolutions
that mark most legal writing. "99 When he finished, Rodell asked him
what the paragraph meant. "[He] sputtered for a moment and then
gave a brief and clear explanation of the proposition he had stated at
much greater length in the article. 'Why didn't you write it that
way?', [Rodell] asked. The point was made."lOO To which Professor
See id. at 588.
Wright, supra note
100 [d.

98

99

2,

at 1458.
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Wright adds: "I am sure that thirty years of very orthodox academic
writing have corrupted my style, but I like to think that even today
my books and articles and briefs are better because of what Fred
taught me in that seminar. "101
Students who may be naturally predisposed to avoiding difficult
legal concepts will surely shy away from coming to grips with the
nebulous ideas presented in a great many law review articles. The
scholarly voice invites analysis by generalities and lacks the discipline
demanded by empirical research. It requires students to learn a new,
complex language that will probably be irrelevant to their future
careers. 102
Lest you think this a diatribe without foundation, consider the
following examples selected more or less at random from recent reviews. On law and literature:
It is one thing . . . to blur the divide between the creation and

criticism of literature, and quite another to blur the distinction between the creation and criticism of law. Historically, the consequence
of the blending of the law and the moral basis from which we criticize
law has almost always been a politically regressive insistence upon the
morality of existing power; and the present decade's fashionable denial
of the difference between fact and value (whether indulged by the
political left or by the political center) has proven to be no exception.
The most obvious and compelling implication of the claim that there
is no real difference between the law that is and the law that ought
to be is that the law which is, is perfect: the law that is, is as it ought
to be. The anti-positivist blurring of that which is from that which
ought to be entails a non-critical, accepting complacency with the
status quo. 103

Granted, this passage is taken out of context - but take it for
granted that the context is every bit as abstruse. If you would rather
flagellate yourself by attempting to understand such "scholarship," try
answering these questions: how can the "creation" and "criticism" of
either law or literature be regarded as parallels capable of distinction?
How can the difference be blurred between the creation of a book (or
film or work of art) and its criticism? How can the law and "the
moral basis from which we criticize law" be blended? What is the
difference between "fact" and "value"? Between "the law that is" and
"the law that ought to be"? What is the writer trying to tell us? That
his sense of syntax is out to lunch? Most readers of general-interest
101Id.

See Getman, supra note 38, at 58!.
Adjudication Is Not Interpretation: Some Reservations About the Law-As-Literature
Movement, 54 TENN. L. REV. 203, 208-09 (1987). The names of the perpetrators of this and
the next several passages have been withheld, in the hopes of preventing hard feelings and libel
suits.
102
103
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journals, unfamiliar with the specific scholarly voice, would not easily
be able to discern a clear meaning.
Such illustrations appear all through law reviews aimed at broad
readerships. On Critical Legal Studies (this from Harvard):
The two internal critical themes stand by synecdoche for the two
major traditions of criticism of modern society that antedate the rise
of modernist literature and philosophy. One of these traditions objects
to the denial of solidarity and to the absence of the varieties of
communal life that could mediate between the isolated individual and
the large-scale organizations of the social world. The other tradition
emphasizes the continuity of group domination under forms of practice
and thought that both conceal and reproduce it. The deviationist
doctrinal argument shows how the two traditions can merge into a
more comprehensive and satisfactory line of criticism once analysis
descends to institutional detail. The practical and theoretical solutions
to the problem of overcorrecting and undercorrecting contract converge with the implications of the attempt to soften the antagonism
between contract and community. 104

How many readers will be able to define or divine what "synecdoche" means? How many intellectual gear-shifts can they be expected to make in order to plow through the hazy double-negatives
in "objects to the denial . . . and to the absence of . . . that could
mediate between"? In the third sentence, does the closing "it" refer to
"tradition"? To "continuity"? To "domination"? Where has the "analysis" in the next sentence been, before it "descends to institutional
detail"? What is the intended connotation of "contract" in the last
sentence? Responsible scholarship (or editing) would supply clarifications where needed, either in text or footnote. !OS All too often,
though, the words stare back.
Meaning aside, elementary matters of grammar, style and syntax
- what Swift referred to as "proper words in proper places"106 104 The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REv. 561, 645 (1983). Despite
entreaties from various law review editors, I found it hard to shorten this excerpt. Its length
not only underscores its longwindedness, but accurately suggests that this passage is one of
many in the article equally difficult to decipher.
105 For an example of good use of explanatory notes, see Fisher & Lande, Efjiciellcy Considerations in Merger Enforcement, 71 CALIF. L. REv. 1580, 1600-02 nn.87-loo (1983).
106 Letter to a Young Clergyman (Jan. 9, 1720), reprinted in J. BARTLETT, FAMILIAR
QUOTATIONS 322 (15th ed. 1980). Examples of weak syntax are easy to find, and likewise not
limited to radical legal scholarship. Here are several from articles I've cited elsewhere in this
Commentary: "Their environmental sensitivity, immense migrations, and economic value, combined with a long history of bitter allocation struggles, make anadromous fish a fruitful area
for legal study." Why Study Pacific Salmon Law?, supra note 23, at 630. "Finally, it must be
noted that there may well be situations where an animal attacks without provocation and has
failed to behave in a manner reasonably calculated to provide the owner with prior notice or
warning regarding its tendency or inclination to attack." If Spot Bites the Neighbor, Shollid
Dick and Jane Go to Jail?, supra note 16, at 1474.
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are often beyond the ken of authors and editors. If good writing is a
reflection of clear thinking, the poobahs of scholarship are either a
bunch of bumbleheads or a barrelful of bad writers. The weight of
the evidence points to the latter.
Finally, these words-to-live-by from a feminist law professor:
The first purpose of this essay is to put forward the global and critical
claim that by virtue of their shared embrace of the separation thesis,
all of our modern legal theory - by which I mean "liberal legalism"
and "critical legal theory" collectively - is essentially and irretrievably
masculine. My use of "I" above was inauthentic, just as the modern,
increasing use of the female pronoun in liberal and critical legal theory,
although well-intended, is empirically and experientially false. For
the cluster of claims that jointly constitute the "separation thesis" the claim that human beings are, definition ally, distinct from one
another, the claim that the referent of "I" is singular and unambiguous,
the claim that the word "individual" has an uncontested biological
meaning, namely that we are each physically individuated from every
other, the claim that we are individuals "first," and the claim that
what separates us is epistemologically and morally prior to what connects us - while "trivially true" of men, are patently untrue of
women. Women are not essentially, necessarily, inevitably, invariably,
always, and forever separate from other human beings: women, distinctively, are quite clearly "connected" to another human life when
pregnant. In fact, women are in some sense "connected" to life and
to other human beings during at least four recurrent and critical
material experiences: the experience of pregnancy itself; the invasive
and "connecting" experience of heterosexual penetration, which may
lead to pregnancy; the monthly experience of menstruation, which
represents the potential for pregnancy; and the post-pregnancy experience of breast-feeding. Indeed, perhaps the central insight of feminist theory of the last decade has been that women are "essentially
connected," not "essentially separate," from the rest of human life,
both materially, through pregnancy, intercourse, and breast-feeding
and existentially, through the moral and practical life. If by "human
beings" legal theorists mean women as well as men, then the "separation thesis" is clearly false. If, alternatively, by "human beings" they
mean those for whom the separation thesis is true, then women are
not human beings. It's not hard to guess which is meant. 107
Let's try to take this passage weakness by weakness. In the first
sentence the plural possessive "their" does not agree with the singular
noun it modifies, "theory." Or should "claim" be plural? By "inauthentic," does the writer mean "not genuine"? The standard student
If" Jllyispmdwce alld Gelldey, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 2-3 (1988). For an attempt to decipher
the legal feminists' agenda, see Bowles, 'Feminist Scholarship' alld 'Women's Studies': Implica/iollS jor Ulliversity Presses, 19 SCHOLARLY PUBLISHING 163 (1988); and Lewin, Feminist
Scholars Spurrillg a Rethinking oj Law, N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 1988, at B9, col. 3.
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Webster's informs that "experiential" means "empirical"; why use both?
The singular collective noun "cluster" at the beginning of the third
sentence disagrees with the plural verb "are" near the end - a nitpick,
perhaps, in view of the seventy-eight words piled on in between.
What is meant by "epistemologically" as it is juxtaposed here with
"morally"? Or by "'trivially true'" as it is placed within quotation
marks? Is there any meaningful difference among the words "essentially," "necessarily," "inevitably," "invariably," "always," and "forever"? Why use them all, except to betray the writer's anger? (And
if that's the case, why not add "fundamentally," "basically," and "elementary"?) Slogging through the rest of the paragraph, we are staggered by the syllogism at the end; it's doubtful that open-minded
readers (particularly nonfeminists) will have an easy time guessing
which conclusion is intended. What's it all mean? Those who have
been especially dogged in trudging through this polysyllabic sludge
may be left with little more than the flimsy notion that it is, after all,
a man's world.
Is this brilliant insight, or intellectual quicksand? You decide. lo8
My Commentary is of course less on the substance of these paragraphs than on their form. Whatever messages they seek to deliver
are lost in a jumble of jargon and gibberish. The point is this: if our
purpose as scholars is to explain and persuade, we are most likely to
succeed if we write simply and clearly. 109
IV.

NARCISSISM AND OTHER PERCEPTIONS

Why such passionate preoccupation with the irrelevant, such obeisance to the obscure? A final word about motivation is in order.
"Vanity of vanities, saith the Preacher, . . . all is vanity!"110
Besides the life-force craving of promotion and tenure, for many
a law professor image is easily as important as substance. To treat
the arcane in traditional academic prose is to impress one's colleagues.
To be published, even cited, in an Ivy League law review is considered
J08 In the interest of fairness I conducted a mini-survey regarding this last excerpt. Of ten
readers asked if they understood it, two said yes-I-think-I-do-but-it's-not-very-c1ear: a professor
familiar with feminist literature, and the editor-in-chief of a leading law review. Eight said noI-can't-figurc-it-out: a practitioner who graduated magna cum laude from Harvard, a feminist
librarian, a law review faculty advisor, a law-and-economics professor, a housewife with a
master's degree in education, the author of nine published books, a law school dean, and a
recent Rhodes Scholar.
109 See Wright, supra note 2, at 1457-58. Even some law professors who fancy themselves
good writers have lapses now and then. See, e.g., Lasson, Group Libel Versus Free SPeech:
When Big Brother Should Butt In, 23 DUQ. L. REv. n, II2 (1984). But see Lessard, What
Do People Do All Day (Book Review), Washington Monthly, Mar. 1972, at 41, 47 (comparing
"Lasson's clean simple prose" with "[Ralph] Nader's cliche-ridden and windy" writing).
110 Ecclesiastes 1:2.
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to be a feather in one's professional cap. To be spurned by the East
Parsipanny Journal of Nursery School Law, on the other hand, is
ignominy most bitter (and usually suffered alone, without telling even
one's spouse).
Habitual publication in law reviews is especially useful to those
professors who view themselves as Traveling Scholars, available on
short notice to grace the halls of fellow law schools for a semester or
two with their particular brand of out-of-town expertise. But even
here the shinola quickly rubs off. And to be roundly ignored while
visiting may be the worst blow of all to self-esteem, a measure of
inferiority that is often visited in turn upon one's colleagues at home.
Scholarship thus becomes inalterably bound up in politics. It was
a wise professor who said the reason academic politics are so sordid
is that the stakes are so low.
V. OLIVE BRANCHES AND ApOLOGIA
(CONCLUSION AND SELF-PRAISE)

Biting the hand that feeds can be very satisfying when protected
by tenure and academic freedom. But the point of this piece is to
urge that we move away from rewarding "scholarship" alone - let's
let the writers be writers, the scholars scholars, teachers teachers, and
leaders leaders - and give them credit accordingly.ll1 Let's recognize
good writing as valuable, even if it's not in a law review, and promote
service to the community at least every bit as much as journal scholarship of questionable worth. Let's mold faculty as position players,
not as clones of one another. Let's require all to be at least minimally
competent in the classroom and the library, but not require proof of
professionalism by way of intellectual coercion or passage through the
publication chute. Surely there are better ways to measure quality.
An olive branch to the Good Reader and Scholar alike: we should
all be forgiven for giving in to the system, for nurturing it ollt of a
strong sense of self-preservation - seeking if nothing else to put bread
on our tables in the way we know best. We mean no harm, even if
we offer little of lasting value.
r utter this Apologia with full recognition of my own knowing
participation in the process, completely aware that whatever few readers are out there may indeed view Lasson's Scholarly Production as
III Again, the fact that this is hardly a new plea should underscore both its importance and
the likelihood that it will go unheeded. As Bard states:
Scholarship is neither served nor celebrated by using it as the fine mesh to sift out some
of our colleagues. Scholarship cannot be coerced, only cultivated. No one can stop a
real scholar. And no useful end is served by squeezing some pages out of unwilling
wri,ters, who are enthusiastic teachers . . . .
Bard, supra note 43, at 245; see Rodell, supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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utterly useless - itself little more than the pretentious pap he so
roundly excoriates.1I2 True, I like to think I have had something
original to say (and have guiltlessly accepted remuneration via research grant or summer stipend). Yet all of my "scholarship" - as
that of most others - must be viewed as exceedingly modest when
compared to that ofa true scholar.1 13
Moreover, I am cognizant of the possibility that - though Solomon
may have had a point - I myself may be unable to avoid cooking
up yet another black pot of scholarly porridge, and thereby run the
risk of various other professorial kettles recalling my past aspersions
cast asunder. 114
112 Those interested in bashing my own scholarship are enthusiastically invited to do so.
See, e.g., Lasson, supra note 109. My most recent pieces are Free Exercise ill the Free State:
Marylalld's Role ill Religious Liberty alld the First Ame1ldmellt, 31 J. CHURCH & ST. 419
(1989); and Racism ill Great Britaill: Drawillg the Lille 011 Free Speech, 7 B.C. THIRD WORLD
L.J. 161 (1987).
113 (Like, say, my father whose single small book on the fourth amendment has been
cited frequently by the Supreme Court.) See N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT
OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (1937). See, e.g., United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 934 n.4 (1984); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984);
Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 375 (1983). LEXIS refers to a host of others.
114 Note, however, that I regard myself as in a no-lose situation. Should I attract n lot of
flack for failure of understanding or gratitude, at least I wiII have finally provoked a thoughtful,
if outraged, response to my work. And my articles wiII have been cited in the Harvard Law
Review, even if it is I who has done the citing. On the other hand, if I get no response, well,
that proves my point, doesn't it?

